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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Kirk Julliard Gosch appeals from his judgment of conviction for manufacturing a
controlled substance (marijuana), possession of a controlled substance with the intent
to deliver (marijuana), and possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces.
Mr. Gosch was convicted following a jury trial and district court imposed unified
sentences of five years, with two years fixed, and placed Mr. Gosch on probation.
Mr. Gosch now appeals, and he asserts that the district court erred by denying his
motion to suppress.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Following the execution of a search warrant at a residence in Hayden, Idaho,
Mr. Gosch was charged with trafficking in cocaine, manufacturing a controlled
substance (marijuana), possession of a controlled substance with the intent to deliver
(marijuana), and possession of marijuana in excess of three ounces. (R., pp.57 -58.)
Mr. Gosch filed a motion to suppress. (R., p.67.) The following facts were found
by the district court after an evidentiary hearing on the motion: On December 2, 2004,
Mr. Gosch was stopped in his vehicle by Hayden City police officers and cited for
possession of marijuana and paraphernalia. (R., p.154.) His criminal history included a
prior arrest in October, 2003, for possession of paraphernalia.

(R., p.154.)

This

information was communicated to the Idaho State Police, who had reports dating back
approximately two years of Mr. Gosch's involvement in marijuana smuggling between
Canada and Kootenai County. (R., pp.154-55.)
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In late December, 2004, the ISP conducted a garbage pull at Mr. Gosch's
residence, where officers found several plastic baggies with corners cut of, as well as
some baggies with a white powdery substance in them. (R., p.155.) On January 6,
2005, the ISP again conducted another garbage pull, finding heat-sealed plastic bags,
some bearing labels which were markings used to denote grades of marijuana from
Canada.

(R., p.155.)

Officers also found plant stems which tested positive for

marijuana, several large butane gas cylinders, and two broken glass jars which tested
positive for THC.

(R., p.155.)

Finally, they found several zip lock baggies which

contained a green leafy substance and from which emanated a strong odor of
marijuana. (R., p.155.)
As a result, Detective Terry Morgan applied for and received a search warrant for
Mr. Gosch's residence at 11974 N. Rimrock Road and for a black 1996 Jeep registered
to Mr. Gosch.

(R., p.155.)

Prior to the execution of the search warrant, Detective

Carlock observed Mr. Gosch and two other individuals carrying items from the
residence to an area where two vehicles were parked.

(R., p.155.)

The Detective

testified that she observed items being placed in both the black Jeep and a white
Suzuki. (R., pp.155-56.)
Kootenai County Police Deputy Shaw assisted in the execution of the warrant.
(R., p.162.) While on the premises, Deputy Shaw walked his drug dog around the
Suzuki, which alerted on the vehicle.

(R., p.162.)

Cocaine and marijuana were

subsequently found in the trunk of the Suzuki. (R., p.156.) In the house, officers found
several devices used for the ingestion of marijuana and several glass vials which
contained suspected "honey oil," a refined marijuana substance. (R., p.156.) Officers
also seized from the house multiple empty glass vials, packaging materials, a bottle of
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MSM (commonly used as a cutting/bulking additive for cocaine distribution), and scales.
(R., p.156.)
Mr. Gosch filed a motion to suppress, asserting that some of the information in
support of the search warrant was stale and that the search of the Suzuki was illegal
because it was not covered by the search warrant. (R., p.132.)1 The State asserted
that the search of the Suzuki was valid pursuant to the automobile exception and that
the evidence found in the Suzuki would inevitably have been discovered. (R., pp.84,
88.)
The district court held that the search was valid pursuant to the automobile
exception. (R., p.159.) The court held that the Suzuki was "readily mobile" and that the
drug dog alert provided probable cause for the search. (R., p.161.)
Mr. Gosch subsequently took his case to trial, where he was acquitted of
trafficking in cocaine but found guilty of the marijuana-related offenses.

(R., p.266.)

The district court imposed concurrent unified sentences of five years, with two years
fixed, and suspended the sentences. 2 (R., p.314.) Initially, counsel for Mr. Gosch failed
to file an appeal from his judgment of conviction, but Mr. Gosch received his appel/ate
rights back through post-conviction proceeding.

See Gosch v. State, 154 Idaho 71

(Ct. App. 2012). Mr. Gosch now appeals. (R., p.355.) He asserts that the district court
erred by denying his motion to suppress.

The district court held that, because counsel for Mr. Gosch failed to provide the court
with a transcript of the search warrant hearing and did not cite with specificity the facts
relied upon by the magistrate that were stale, Mr. Gosch had failed to meet his burden
that the warrant was not supported by probable cause. (R., p.158.) Mr. Gosch does not
challenge this holding on appeal.
2 Mr. Gosch has satisfied his sentences, making any sentencing claims moot.
1

3

...

ISSUE
Did the district court err by denying Mr. Gosch's motion to suppress?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Gosch's Motion To Suppress

A.

Introduction
Mr. Gosch asserts that because the State failed to prove that the white Suzuki

parked at his residence was "readily mobile," the State failed to prove that the
automobile exception applied.

He therefore asserts that the district court erred by

denying his motion to suppress.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision

on a motion to suppress is challenged, this Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact
that are supported by substantial evidence but freely reviews the application of
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561
(Ct. App.1996).

At a suppression hearing, the power to assess the credibility of

witnesses, resolve factual conflicts, weigh evidence, and draw factual inferences is
vested in the trial court. State v. Valdez-Molina, 127 Idaho 102,106 (1995).
C.

The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Gosch's Motion To Suppress
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: ''The right of

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... " U.S. CONST. amend IV.
The Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); State v. Johnson, 110 Idaho
516, 524 (1986). The Idaho Constitution provides its own, similar protections against
5

unreasonable searches and seizures. IDAHO CaNST. Art. I, § 17; State v. Donato, 135
Idaho 469, 471 (2001).
Warrantless searches are per se unreasonable.

Mincey

v.

Arizona, 437 U.S.

385, 390 (1978). Therefore, a warrantless search is presumed to violate the Fourth
Amendment unless the State demonstrates that one of the we"-established and welldelineated exceptions to this requirement is applicable to the facts.
see a/so State

Id. at 390-91;

v. Holton, 132 Idaho 501, 503-04 (1999) (holding the same standard

applies to Art. I, § 17 of the Idaho Constitution).
One of those exceptions is the automobile exception, which allows officers to
search the vehicle and containers therein if they have probable cause that contraband is
inside.

United States

v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 823-24 (1982); State v. Gal/egos,

120

Idaho 894, 898 (1991). The United States Supreme Court has stated, "[o]ur first cases
establishing the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement
were based on the automobile's 'ready mobility,' an exigency sufficient to excuse failure
to obtain a search warrant once probable cause to conduct the search is clear."
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996) (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S.

386, 390-391 (1985); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925».

"More recent

cases provide a further justification: the individual's reduced expectation of privacy in an
automobile, owing to its pervasive regulation."

Id.

Thus, the standard for the

automobile exception is: "[i]f a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe
it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle
without more." Id. In Carney, the Supreme Court explained, "when a vehicle is being
used on the highways, or if it is readily capable of such use and is found stationary in a
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place not regularly used for residential purposes - temporary or otherwise
justifications for the vehicle come into play." Carney,

the two

1 U.S. at 392-93.

Parked cars may be searched so long as they pass this test

they are readily

mobile and there is probable cause to believe they contain contraband.

See /d.

In

Labron, the United States Supreme Court reversed two cases from Pennsylvania

involving the searches of parked cars. /d. at 939. In the first case, "police observed
respondent Labron and others engaging in a series of drug transactions on a street in
Philadelphia. The police arrested the suspects, searched the trunk of a car from which
the drugs had been produced, and found bags containing cocaine." Id. In the second
case,
an undercover informant agreed to buy drugs from respondent Randy Lee
Kilgore's accomplice, Kelly Jo Kilgore. To obtain the drugs, Kelly Jo drove
from the parking lot where the deal was made to a farmhouse where she
met with Randy Kilgore and obtained the drugs. After the drugs were
delivered and the Kilgores were arrested, police searched the farmhouse
with the consent of its owner and also searched Randy Kilgore's pickup
truck; they had seen the Kilgores walking to and from the truck, which was
parked in the driveway of the farmhouse.

/d. The Supreme Court held that the automobile exception applied to both of these
situations. /d. at 940. In these cases, the vehicles were readily mobile - in the first
case, the vehicle was parked on a city street, a temporary location. See id.

In the

second case, after the drug deal was made in the parking lot, both Randy Lee Kilgore
drove to the farmhouse to complete the transaction; therefore, Randy Kilgore's vehicle
was readily mobile. See id.
In this case, the district court held that the Suzuki was readily mobile and relied
on three cases: United States v. Hatley, 15 F.3d 856 (9 th Cir. 1994), United States v.
Markham, 844 F.2d 366 (6 th Cir. 1988), and State v. Botte/son, 102 Idaho 90 (1981).
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In Hatley, the Ninth Circuit held that the vehicle at issue,

not actually

mobile, it was apparently mobile. There was nothing apparent to the officers to suggest
the car was immobile. It was not up on blocks, and there is no information in the record
to indicate the tires were flat or that wheels of the car were missing." Hatley, 15 F.3d at
859.

Mr. Gosch asserts that this analysis should be rejected because it places the

burden on the defendant to show that a car is immobile, when the burden of
establishing an exception to the warrant requirement is always on the State. Just as the
State must demonstrate probable cause, it must also demonstrate that a vehicle is
readily mobile.
In Markham, the appellant asserted that a warrant could have been obtained
while the vehicle was unattended and under surveillance, and therefore, there were no
exigent circumstances related to vehicle's mobility. Markham, 844 F.2d at 368. The
Sixth Circuit rejected this, holding that ready mobility was not the only basis for the
automobile exception. Id. The Sixth Circuit noted that its case presented a "variation
on Camey because the vehicle searched was parked in a private driveway" but held
that the search was valid pursuant to Carney.

Id.

Mr. Gosch submits that that this

rationale should be rejected, as Carney specifically identified the situations that give rise
to the exception: "When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it is readily
capable of such use and is found stationary in a place not regularly used for
residential purposes - temporary or otherwise - the two justifications for the vehicle
exception come into play."

Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93.

Thus, the automobile

exception applies in two scenarios: 1) a traffic stop, where the automobile exception
most often arises; and 2) when the vehicle is readily capable of such use and is found
stationary in a place not regularly used for residential purposes.
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In this case,

Mr. Gosch's vehicle was at the residence, and thus was not in a place "not regularly
used for residential purposes."
The Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Botte/son is not contrary to this
proposition.

In Bottelson, the third case relied on by the district court in this case,

officers drove by the farmhouse of Jeff and Bonnie Rice, who were friends of one of the
officers.

Batte/son, 102 Idaho at 91.

Id.

The officer knew that his friends would

normally not be at home at the time of day that he drove by. Id. The officer saw a
vehicle that did not belong to the Rices in the driveway; the trunk was open and the
defendant was standing at the rear of the automobile. Id. The defendant shut the trunk
when he saw officers approach. Id. One officer observed a window missing from the
Rices' residence, and the other officer observed that a door leading from the front porch
into the house was standing open. Id. The defendant was then directed to open the
trunk the vehicle; he complied, and various items belonging to the Rices were found in
the vehicle. Id.
The Idaho Supreme Court held that the defendant, who presented no evidence at
the suppression hearing, failed to establish an expectation of privacy in the vehicle. Id.
at 92. However, even assuming that the defendant could have made such a showing,
the court held that the search was valid.

Id.

The Court correctly noted that the

automobile exception "rests not only on the mobility rationale, but also on," the reduced
expectation of privacy. Id. at 93. The Court concluded:
As measured by the constitutional standards reflected in the cases cited
above, we think that the officers in the case at bar were justified under the
fourth amendment in searching the trunk of the Pontiac without first
obtaining a warrant. There was abundant probable cause that the
automobile contained evidence of a crime. The foreign automobile backed
up to the house with its trunk open, the removed window pane, the
opened porch door, the defendant's closing of the trunk door when the
officers arrived, the suspicious automobile registration, and all the other
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circumstances evident to the officers clearly made it highly probable that a
burglary was being committed and that evidence of the crime was in the
trunk of the Pontiac.
ld. at 93. The Court therefore held that the search was valid. Id. Botte/son, however,
does not control the outcome of this case. The Botte/son Court never addressed the
issue of whether the vehicle was "readily mobile," and for good reason. The probable
cause to search the vehicle was evidence indicating that a burglary was in progress and
that the vehicle was being used to perpetrate that burglary. The only conclusion that
can be drawn from the facts in Botte/son was that the defendant drove the vehicle to the
residence, took items belonging to the Rices, and was going to use the vehicle to leave.
Thus, the mobility of the vehicle, which did not belong to the owners of the residence
and therefore would not normally be parked there, was never in dispute.
In the instant case, the district court stated,
In the present case, Defendant contends that since the Suzuki "was not
about to be moved" and was "secure where it was," the mobility concerns
that justify the automobile exception were not present when the Suzuki
was searched without a warrant. This assertion is simply not supported by
existing case law. The distinction between -vehicles that may be searched
without a warrant and those that may not is not made based on whether or
not the subject vehicle is "secure" or "not about to be moved." Rather, the
distinction primarily rests on the ability of the subject vehicle to be readily
moved to another location. Here, the Suzuki was located in a driveway in
close proximity to Defendant's residence. There was no testimony that it
was mounted on blocks, had flat tires or was otherwise inoperable. Cf.
Hatley, at 859. Contrary to Defendant's argument, the actions of the
Defendant on the day of the search indicate that he was using, or was
about to use, both the Suzuki and the Jeep to transport belongings from
his residence to another location, which in and of itself indicates that the
Suzuki was capable of being moved in the manner contemplated by the
automobile exception. The fact that the Suzuki was parked in a residential
driveway and without an operator when the warrantless search
commenced does not place the Suzuki outside of the automobile
exception.

(R., p.161.) Mr. Gosch does not disagree with the district court that the fact the Suzuki
was not about to be moved means that a vehicle is not readily mobile. If that were the
10

case, the defendants in Labron would have prevailed because the vehicle searches in
those cases were made after the defendants had been arrested and thus there was no
danger that the vehicle would be moved by them.

See Labron, 518 U.S. at 939.

However, the burden is still on the State to prove both ready mobility and probable
cause. And there is simply no evidence that the Suzuki was mobile. As the district
court noted, it was stationary in a residential driveway.

And as is set forth above,

"When a vehicle is being used on the highways, or if it readily capable of such use
and is found stationary in a place not regularly used
temporary or otherwise

residential purposes -

the two justifications for the vehicle exception come into play."

Carney, 471 U.S. at 392-93 (emphasis added). Mr. Gosch's vehicle was not being used

on the highway and it was found stationary at a residence. The two justifications for the
exception are not in play here. No officer testified to ever seeing the vehicle move (and
the district court found no facts indicating that it had been recently moved.) Finally,
simply placing property in a vehicle is insufficient to demonstrate that the vehicle is
readily mobile, especially when a car is parked at a residence - the trunk of a vehicle
can be used for storage just as easily as for transport.
As is set forth above, the standard for the automobile exception is: "[i]f a car is
readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth
Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more." Labron, 518 U.S.
at 940. In a traffic stop scenario, this is non-issue because the vehicle will be moving
prior to the stop. When the vehicle is stationary, however, the State must prove that it is
readily mobile. When it is found stationary in a place not regularly used for residential
purposes, such a city street or a gas station, it is more reasonable to conclude that the
vehicle is mobile because it had to be moved to get to that location. A residential
11

driveway, however, is very different, and that is why Carney emphasizes places not
regularly used for residential purposes.

term, "readily mobile," must mean

something, and if it can mean a vehicle parked in a driveway where there is no evidence
that it has been recently driven, the term means next to nothing, and the only concern is
probable cause.

Because the automobile exception requires both ready mobility and

probable cause 3 , and because the State presented no evidence of ready mobility, the
district court's order must be reversed.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Gosch requests that the district court's order denying his motion to suppress
be reversed, that his convictions be vacated, and that this case be remanded for further
proceedings.
DATED this 1st day of April, 2014.

JUSTIN

. . FrrIS

v

Deput~'$!~)Appeliate Public Defender

3 Mr. Gosch does not challenge the district court's holding that the State had probable
cause once the drug dog alerted on the vehicle. An alert by a reliable, trained canine
unit provides probable cause. Florida v. Harris, _
U.S. _ , 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1059
(2013). Mr. Gosch only challenges the mobility finding.
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